I think this exposes some of the ignorance of the peaceniks. As much as they would like to think so, I don't think that W. is all that interested in going to war, but, rather is fully prepared to do so if necessary, and wants Saddam to know that. Showing resolve and strength, leads more easily, I think, to non-aggressive solutions. If all the administration did was talk peace and sing kumbaya with Saddam, what are the chances of this sort of useful compromise being reached? He is a psychopath and a liar, and must be dealth with from a stronger position, not an equal or weaker position.

It reminds me of a [probably unrelated] point someone made on another blog [i'll have to find it]. If the anti-war supporters are really about root causes and sitting down and discussing differences peacefully -- why don't they think about the root causes for people thinking we should be willing to go to war, and sit down and discuss the option peacefully? Instead they use rather inflammatory and insulting [and ironic?] Nazi rhetoric.

Well Harry, just look at what 9 months can do. So you didn't think bush was all that interested in going to war?
With all that oil for Halliburton? You couldn't have been that blind. And where are those WMDs? It's bush who is the psychopath and the liar and I wouldn't insult HITLER'S memory with a comparison. Atleast Hitler didn't say that christian duty led him to do what he did.

Excerpts from David Kay's report:

We have discovered dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002.
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With regard to biological warfare activities, which has been one of our two initial areas of focus, ISG teams are uncovering significant information - including research and development of BW-applicable organisms, the involvement of Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) in possible BW activities, and deliberate concealment activities. All of this suggests Iraq after 1996 further compartmentalized its program and focused on maintaining smaller, covert capabilities that could be activated quickly to surge the production of BW agents.
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The Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) beginning around 1999 expanded its laboratories and research activities and increased its overall funding levels.... Starting around 2000, the senior Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and high-level Ba'ath Party official Dr. Khalid Ibrahim Sa'id began several small and relatively unsophisticated research initiatives that could be applied to nuclear weapons development... The ISG nuclear team has found indications that there was interest, beginning in 2002, in reconstituting a centrifuge enrichment program. Most of this activity centered on activities of Dr. Sa'id that caused some of his former colleagues in the pre-1991 nuclear program to suspect that Dr. Sa'id, at least, was considering a restart of the centrifuge program.
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The Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) beginning around 1999 expanded its laboratories and research activities and increased its overall funding levels.... Starting around 2000, the senior Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and high-level Ba'ath Party official Dr. Khalid Ibrahim Sa'id began several small and relatively unsophisticated research initiatives that could be applied to nuclear weapons development... The ISG nuclear team has found indications that there was interest, beginning in 2002, in reconstituting a centrifuge enrichment program. Most of this activity centered on activities of Dr. Sa'id that caused some of his former colleagues in the pre-1991 nuclear program to suspect that Dr. Sa'id, at least, was considering a restart of the centrifuge program.
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Any actual WMD weapons or material is likely to be small in relation to the total conventional armaments footprint and difficult to near impossible to identify with normal search procedures. It is important to keep in mind that even the bulkiest materials we are searching for, in the quantities we would expect to find, can be concealed in spaces not much larger than a two car garage.
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In searching for retained stocks of chemical munitions, ISG has had to contend with the almost unbelievable scale of Iraq's conventional weapons armory, which dwarfs by orders of magnitude the physical size of any conceivable stock of chemical weapons. For example, there are approximately 130 known Iraqi Ammunition Storage Points (ASP), many of which exceed 50 square miles in size and hold an estimated 600,000 tons of artillery shells, rockets, aviation bombs and other ordinance. Of these 130 ASPs, approximately 120 still remain unexamined. As Iraqi practice was not to mark much of their chemical ordinance and to store it at the same ASPs that held conventional rounds, the size of the required search effort is enormous.
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