Jane Galt asks what Chirac's motivations were for threatening to unconditionally veto any use of force against Iraq by the U.N. Why indeed?

She does a good analysis which argues that the move wasn't beneficial to France's current geopolitical interests. And points out the French government must have known the U.S. would ultimately have resorted to force, one way or another. Of course they did. Even back when 1441 was passed the character and determination of Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld were obvious, They'd said it themselves.

And we need to consider Chirac's about-face on his use-of-force stance. When 1441 was signed, according to Powell's account, he clearly indicated a willingness to consider the use of force. And, as Jane points out, he would certain have understood that it was our intention. Then, months later, he says he will veto any use of force. Why the about face?

So the first question is: Were his actions deliberate? Did he change his mind halfway through? Did he "gamble and lose"? Jane argues that Chirac would have known better, and I agree: He's been in the French government a long time, and is one of its ultimate political insiders.

So I don't think Chirac just realized something he hadn't thought of earlier. It's consistent to assume Chirac is a rational, well-informed actor, and thus I think it
s consistent to assume either that Chirac knew what he was doing all along, or that someone behind him did. Which depends on whether you think he was being sincere when he originally told Powell he would consider use of force.

So if we're assuming rational behavior, e.g. that the French government knew what it was doing, and further, that they knew what the result would be, we should then believe that what resulted was view, ahead of time, as being more beneficial than the losses.

Jane has already pointed out the losses: Poor relations with the U.S. and U.K., France hacked off some European countries, and diminished the power of the U.N. from which France currently derives some poliltical authority.

So what was gained? Jane won't consider that "hurting the U.S." could have been a goal, since she sees the short-term harm as being larger, but, the gains are expected to exist in the long term, not the short term.

Consider:

(1) While ties between a few European nations have been weakened, others have been strenghtened. France, Germany, and Belgium have never been so closely aligned before

(2) Within theses countries, these actions have increased the voter's support, and probably also trust, of their government, giving their leaders more ability to oppose the U.S. decisively on future issues.

(3) France certainly did give America a black eye: from what I can see, European anti-Americanism is certainly on the upswing. America has generally had a positive perception in most of Europe. Now, the French sentiment seems to have won in these regions: The U.S. is now seen as a dangerous unilateralist nation who's power needs to be checked among a certain stata of the world community.

These nations could easily find common cause around a desire to "do something" about the U.S. Even Arab nations might lend their influence to such a cause. You have the perfect climate for building the next major superpower.

(4) While France does derive some credibility from the U.N., its not clear that France's future was every found in that direction. France is, as far as I can see, even more of a "unilateralist" nation than the U.S. As the Ivory Coast and Rwandan situations illustrate, France usually acts as it pleases. (Luckily, Kofi seems to like Chirac and usually legitimizes these actions after the fact.)

But the power vacuum left by a deligitimized U.N. works far more to Europe's advantage than America's, with its proximity to the Mideast, Russia, and Africa. If this was a conscious decision, and Europe could bait the U.S. into doing the deed and taking the fall, so much the better!

(5) The previous gives credence for arguments to re-militarize Europe. If more European GDP could be routed into increased military spending, Europe's military/industrial complex, which is largely joinly-owned (and thus profits) the French and German governments, would have a lot to gain. Increased European, Russian, Chinese, and Arab patronage for Airbus (not Boeing) won't hurt matters any either.

Again, if we only consider short-term gains in French international influence, Chirac's actions are best explained either by muddled, confused thinking and actions. But if we believe Chirach was no fool, then we must believe (a) he knew what the obvious results would be, and (b) that he felt those results would have an overall benefit to the causes he holds dear.

In the short term, I think the U.S. may receive a boost in influence from the current situation, especially if we do well with Iraq. But we will be feared yet hated. In the long term, I believe these events set the stage for the decline of American influence abroad and the ultimate rise of a unified European entity, anti-American in character, desiring and ultiately achieving increased international influence.