Recently, a friend of mine said he didn't agree with politically or economically isolating despotic regimes. This is my answer as to why I agree with economic sanctions and boycotts...

I have no strong position on diplomatic isolation. If it seems if a country appears willing to reform in some manner, we should certainly engage them in talks. If we take Cuba as an example, I don't see any willingness of that kind currently -- recently few dignitaries have dropped by (Carter and some Hollywood folks), and Castro imprisioned a few hundred more pro-democracy activists.

It seems to me "diplomatic relations" in and of themselves can be useless to harmful if they only produce "talks" or signed agreements, but fail to deliver substantial reforms. Useless, if nobody does anything, and harmful in cases (like the recent Carter agreement with North Korea) where the democracies do what they do -- keep their end of the bargain (give N. Korea fuel, allow them a nuclear fuel program) -- while dicatatorships do what they do -- take the concessions and run while ignoring their promises (build nuclear weapons anyway, kill more dissidents, etc.).

Further, looking back over history, I do not see many examples of cases where despotic regimes have been changed by discussions or signed agreements. I don't really think guys like Castro, Admin, Saddam, and the top guys at China's CCP (Communist Party) really care about such things.

But I do see that force, economic or military, or a credible threat of such have been effective. (The USSR was undermined using both.) So I am in favor of using trade restrictions, from partial blockages to all-out isolation, to provide oppressive, despotic, and authoritarian regimes incentives to reform

Summary

Briefly, my rationale is:

1. Unrestricted trade moves money from reasonably-compensated workers to despots
2. Unrestricted trade doesn't fundamentally improve the situation in these countries
3. It sends the wrong message to "better" countries
4. We're aiding despots militarily
5. Unfettered trade and economic ties to despots corrupt our own institutions
6. My impression is that most dissidents advocate the same approach
7. It's an extension of my own conscience

Below I explain why I think each of these statements is true, and cite relevant evidence. But I'm quite open to arguments or (better yet) evidence to the contrary.

1. Unrestricted trade moves money from reasonably-compensated workers to despots

In Theory

We're living an age where the little shop up the street has to worry about competition from the other side of the globe. In a world with a lot of unemployed folks in third-world countries, it's understandable that work (especially that which requires little education) is going seek to be done at the cheapest possible cost.

So when the textile mill in Harrisburg, PA, paying union workers $17/hour has to close it's doors because the same job can be done for $1.50/hour in the Phillipines, I can understand that. I've often thought competition is God's way of giving poorer folks around the planet a shot at some of the good things we've had.

But there's a limit to how cleaply work can reasonably be done, even in the poorest of countries. Hazardous work requires certain precautions, and imposes certain limits on exposure. And a worker will not do even mundane jobs if they don't see a certain, measurable increase in their standard of living for their tradeoff.

This process is a good one, and the way economics was "designed" to work: It naturally moves work to poor folks, and eventually makes everyone wealthier.

However, this effect can be distorted when states use their monopoly on force to compel or coerce distortions or violations of these natural rules. For example, the state might control the media to prevent it from identifying dangers associated with certain kinds of labor, thus preventing laborers from making an informed decision. It might prohibit highly-skilled workers from emigrating to places where their skills can receive market-based compensation. It might use force to compel labor under conditions and for compensation which workers would not otherwise freely choose (for example, prison labor).

Further, it's helpful to remember that totalitarian states artifically create the very conditions of starvation and deprivation which make even poor working conditions an improvement: Before the revolution Russia was Europe's largest exporter of grain, afterwards, the largest importer. Likewise, in China Mao's policies killed or starved as many as 80 million Chinese. Milder contemporary verions of the same policies have a more limited effect. When a country has deprived peasants of the economic freedoms by which they better themselves (buying, selling, setting prices for their goods, changing their location), foreign labor contracts, even with a hefty government subsidy, will look comparatively attractive.

When this happens, the Phillipino or Indian worker, who is being paid about as cheaply as possible, loses a job which goes to (for example) a Chinese prison which can do the work even cheaper still. Or even a non-prision factory, since labor costs are still being reduced by prohibiting free association, collective bargaining, and freedom of the press which would allow workers to make fully informed decisions. And if and when there is a profit, the totalitarian government gets to keep it, rather than the worker.

How is this making the world a better place?

In Practice

About a decade ago, video was smuggled out of China showing teenagers building parts which used highly toxic chemicals. In these films they were immersing their hands and arms. The teenagers apparently did not live with families: they were showing sleeping in bunks one the "factory" premises.

Recently Xu Yongze, a famous Christian leader was released and reported prisioners were being forced to 2,500 Christmas lights every day with a thin wire. Near the end, as his case become more famous internationally, he was treated better than most (he was not compelled to work, and his ten-year sentence was cut in half), and helped a weaker prisioner meet his quota. Quotas in other prisons can be as high as 5,000 bulbs per day, and prisioners can work 16 to 20 hours daily.

And Chinese officials are clever: They will open one legimate factory to manufacture brand-name products, allowing foreigners to visit and inspect it. But it serves as a front for many more such operations which happen behind barbed wire, at gunpoint.

Even more profitable is the grisly Chinese organ transplatation business. I first heard a story which exposed this a number of years ago on network TV: It was replete with horrifying details: People had their blood types tested before trial, those found guilty had anticoagulants and other preservatives injected into them before they were shot. Wealthy foreigners received transplants at Chinese clinics nearby and were told there was nothing amiss in the process. Profits went to the Red Army. [References: 1, 2, 3, 4]

The State Department estimates there are about 2 million people in Chinese prisons. Critics of this number instead estimate the true number to be as much as ten times higher, with a shocking 25-30% of those being interred for polical or religious reasons. The closed nature of Chinese society makes it hard to know what the correct number is. While some claim prision labor only offsets internment costs, the Laogai Research Foundation says it is actually quite profitable:

As overall trade with China grew, so did the trade in Laogai products. The Laogai is an integral part of the Chinese government’s economic policies. The Laogai is now more than self-sustaining: foreign exchange earned through the trade in Laogai goods has funded the building of larger, more economically viable camps.

If so, the American consumer buying Chinese products is unwittingly providing economic incentives for further imprisionment in Chinese labor camps.

Most critics say there is nothing inherantly wrong with having prison labor per se: Factors taken into account include treatment of the inmates, working hours and conditions, and issues about the quality of justice by which inmates are incarcerated. Considering these factors, there is debate on the wisdom of US prison labor. Defenders point out conditions are humane and work is limited to that of a normal US employee. Critics point to racial inequity in sentencing and perverse incentives being created.

Neither stance has any bearing on this argument: If humane prison labor is allowable, and our own is humane, then it's valid to considering opposing countries like China because their prison labor does not meet these standards. If our own system is inhumane or otherwise illegitimate, then it's not clear to me why a threat from other countries would not be helpful in reforming it.

To conclude: That totalitarianism is effective in creating artificially cheap labor can be confirmed by looking in any store: In certain categories one is hard-pressed to find any products not made in China. Each of those jobs were done formerly by people who, though poor, at least had freedom of the press, free association, and the right to work at any job they chose or walk away. Now, purchasing those products distributes less of our wealth, and a greater total of it goes to support a despotic government, and smaller portion of it goes to support people.

Two poor Indians lose jobs, perhaps now they are starving. One Chinese peasant gets a job, but sees an improvement in standard of living which is less than the commensurate loss to the Indian. Another Chinese prison laborer is told to work longer hours, or even worse, a man who might have been found innocent is found guilty because they need one more laborer. And a bureaucrat in Beijing, or military commander, has a few more yen in his budget. And we save $.28 on the price of the item.

I have trouble seeing how this change is an improvement.

2. Unrestricted trade doesn't fundamentally improve the situation in these countries

Recent standard of living improvements in China

In recent years, China has been granted MFN trading status and membership in the WTO. Simultaenously, it has enacted limited market reforms. During this time, the average standard of living has risen in China.

So it's entirely reasonable to ask, when we consider China's increased standard of living, how much of the improvement is due to market reforms versus international trade?

It's an important question to ask when we see a peasants starving under some dictatorship. If we believe the problem is primarily due to economic isolation, we look to the isolators: if so, perhaps failing to trade with such a country is an immoral position. But if not, then the responsibility for starvation and distress lies at the feet of the those who run the country and set it's policies.

Based on what I've learned of history, I'd guess that a country's internal policies have much more to do it's standard of living than its level of trade with other nations.

I've hinted at some evidence previously when I mention Russian and Chinese starvation.  As further evidence, we can look to the most recent sanctions against Iraq: We had limited trade with Iraq, mostly foodstuff and medicine in exchange for oil. When we entered the country, we find even this limited level of trade had been compromised by the policies of the state, which redirected this wealth to military purchases and benefiting heads of state and those closely policially aligned with such. We encountered Iraqi soldiers with wounds from the Iran-Iraq war, wounds which had not been adequately treated even then, when Iraq was quite wealthy had no trade restrictions!

If we want to look back in history to find an example where countries could trade freely among each other, but where they did not have internal free markets, we only need to look back to the Soviet bloc and its diverse satellites. Despite having a large chunk of the world within this trading bloc, the standard of living was incredibly poor; shorages and deprivation were commonplace. History seems to show a lack of international trade is not what causes most suffering.

Further, most the articles I read on China credit "a shift to a market economy" as being the key factor in improving the standard of living. Perhaps the authors mean to include "international trade" in this term, but nonetheless, most commentators seem to be pointing to the freedom to start a business, set prices, or choose one's job as the most important factor in their minds.

So all of the above lead me to think that internal economic policy, especially in large nations, matters much more than international trade. And thus in China, we can't just look at a raised standard of living, international trade, and assume the latter was the sole or primary cause of the former, while neglecting something as important as internal economic freedom and policies!

I am a big fan of the current Chinese economic reforms. I'd like to see more of them. But that doesn't mean I think China is there yet, nor that we should be engaged in completely unrestricted trade yet, with nor that I need to support buying products whose discounted price is still partially or wholly subsidized by oppression.

Last I'd point out that if we cite the current situation in China as an improvement, it's hardly evidence against the effectiveness of international pressure and economic cold-shouldering! Some of the pressure to enact these limited reforms arose from the very desire to escape the isolationism China had experienced previously.

Zero or negative effect on human rights

So far, we've only discussed economic freedom, but not polical or religious freedom. There are those who would argue that without the latter, the former is meaningless. I tend to fall in that camp, but my alleged convictions have not been truly tested (for which I am grateful).

Recently, we've given China close to everything they've wanted in terms of international trade. Supporters of this stance urged the Clinton administration to do so on the idea that international "free trade" would somehow naturally produce a free society and curb human rights abuses. How has it worked out since then?

As of 1997, "Tibet Watch" commented:

Directly following President Clinton's 1994 de-linking of human rights and trade, crack-downs in Tibet occurred almost immediately. Two years later, the 1996 State Department Report on Human Rights revealed that human rights abuses in China have consistently risen. The report also indicated that goverment control over religious and other fundamental rights have intensified.

Apparently, in beginning of 1998, there was a brief period where the government allowed a bit more criticism of corruption and political debate. But like the 1957 "hundred flowers" movement in Mao's China, that position was rapidly reversed and, as before, any dissidents thus exposed were rapidly incarcerated. (The 'hundred flowers' movement was viewed as a trick for bringing dissidents out into the open.)

About this period, Human Rights Watch (HRW) commented in 2002:

There has been a clear deterioration of human rights conditions in China. A tightening of controls on basic freedoms began in late 1998, escalated throughout 1999, and has continued into the new year. The range of the crackdown suggests that a nationally coordinated campaign is underway to shut down all peaceful opposition in the name of maintaining "social stability."

That same year, when asked about the effect of increased trade on human rights, HRW said:

But when it comes to political freedom or fundamental political reform, there is no evidence thus far of trade in itself improving human rights. In areas with the largest influx of foreign investment, restrictions on peaceful political, religious or independent labor activities are as stringent as in other parts of China.

In 2001, the State Department concluded,

The Chinese government "continued to commit numerous and serious" human rights abuses in 2001, with the possible exception of some minor developments regarding Tibet, press freedom and an independent judiciary, according to the State Department's China Country Report on Human Rights Practices for the Year 2001.

The authors of the report found, in particular, that the Chinese government continued to restrict freedom of religion and intensified controls on some unregistered churches in 2001. The report cited the case of several leaders of the unregistered South China Church who were arrested in July 2001 and subsequently sentenced to death.

In addition, the report says the Chinese government's "strike-hard" campaign against crime -- characterized by roundups of suspects and mass sentencing rallies begun in April 2001 -- has targeted some dissidents, separatists, and underground church members. This is especially true in Xinjiang, where "the campaign has been vigorously carried out" against those deemed to be "splittists" by the Chinese authorities, the report adds.

This summer, regarding 2002 and early 2003, the State Department reported:

.... we saw incremental, but unprecedented steps in the right direction on human rights, including the release of a number of prominent prisoners of conscience, the visit of representatives of the Dalai Lama to China for the first time in two decades, and numerous commitments undertaken by the Chinese government at the U.S.-China human rights dialogue last December aimed at systemic human rights reform. We were hopeful that these were signals of a new commitment by the Chinese government to cooperate with the United States on human rights issues. We have been disappointed, therefore, to see negative developments in 2003. The commitments to make progress on human rights concerns made by China at the conclusion of the December human rights dialogue have not been met, and there have been a number of troubling incidents since the beginning of the year.

A few token steps forward (a few released prisioners, a visit by a few Buddhists, a promise to talk), and a lot of the same business as usual (many more arrested, etc... read the whole report if interested: quite a lot of documented abuses, and lots of hints we're only viewing the tip of the iceberg).

Before Congress, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Randall G. Schriver summarized the situation:

"While we seek to highlight and encourage the positive trends that we see, this does not mean that the overall situation is good. It clearly is not, and we remain very disturbed at the harassment and serious mistreatment of many religious believers in China, as well as by the Chinese Government's continued insistence on controlling religious activity," Schriver added.

A Human Rights Watch director concluded that in 2002 there had been "no improvement".

Prison conditions seem to be deteriorating. One article argues that the prison labor camps are unprofitable, and must make change the nature of their businesses and force prisoners to work longer hours since WTO entry. Another argues that the prisons are quite profitable, and hours are expanding, conditions are deteriorating, and more are being built. Either way, things don't appear to be improving

By all metrics I can find, in terms of human rights, the situation either seems to be "business as usual" or worse than before WTO ratification. Perhaps I have wrong statistics if so, point me to a more positive picture, I'm not finding it. Or perhaps at some point in the future things will improve.

But at the moment, it's hard to for me to conclude there's any positive correlation between increased trade and human rights conditions in China: the correlation is either flat or negative. And if so, this seriously undermines the contention that unrestricted trade improves the human rights situation in China, and suggested we should perhaps have withheld trade pending serious, visible, sustained human rights improvements.

Indeed, it seems that in some (but not all) cases, economic sanctions work:

A clear example of international economic boycotts or sanctions genuinely benefiting a suppressed labor movement is the example of Poland, when the USA led the way in imposing economic penalties on Poland after the Communist government in 1981 banned the Solidarity movement and arrested about 30,000 Solidarity members. The liberalization in Poland that brought about an end to the Communist regime was prompted in significant part by Poland's desire to get rid of the sanctions.

3. It sends the wrong message to "better" countries

We all know what happens when somebody does something bad and gets away with it: It sends a bad example, and everyone else wants to try it.When we "look the other way" by failing to break or restrict trading ties with regimes who engage in flagrant human rights abuses, we send a powerful message that this sort of thing is no big deal.

Combine this with a competitive labor market through artificially depressed labor costs (via state coercion and deprivation), and you set up a condition where a "race to the bottom" can ensue. Even in the U.S., guys like Bob Graham, noting that we're being killed economically by the Chinese, are advocating we adopt their methods and expand prison labor programs.

Indeed, why not? If it's fine to buy things made by Chinese prison laborers, it must be even better to buy things made by ones in the US, who work fewer hours, live in better conditions, and often have a bit of pocket change left to buy things when they're done with their day of telemarketing. Since we're subsidizing prison labor already, why not buy "Made in USA?"

4. We're aiding despots militarily

I hope I don't have to make the case that whatever their problems, the goverments of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and others are preferable those of Beijing and North Korea. And, as allies, whatever our shortcomings may be, I trust today's United States more than today's People's Republic of China not to undermine democracy in these countries.

Whatever the criticism, I don't really think the US looks longingly at Afghanistan, or even Iraq for that matter, and wishes to claim them as sovereign territories. Yet Iraq definitely wanted to own Kuwait (for starters), China definitely longs to control Taiwan, and North Korea undoubtedly has been window shopping for a smaller, yet more economically productive country at it's southern border to "liberate". And unprovoked force is definitely not out the window for these kinds of purchases. (Not to mention that Castro has aided several such efforts in Latin America.)

Unrestricted trade allows despots to build up armies and develop weapons systems most of us would rather they not have. China, for example, lags behind Taiwan militarily. But it has used it's trading ties with use to (a) cancel shipments of Aegis systems needed for Taiwan's defense, and (b) aquire superior technology to that possess by the Taiwanese. Maybe I'm just a sentimentalist, but I like a Taiwanese democracy, and note we've promised to protect her against Chinese military aggression.

In his book Hegemon, Steven Mosher argues China's history will inevitably lead it to need to retake Taiwan, and then drive it to be the sole superpower influencing its traditional borders. Whether this is true, or China's military will rest peacefully after it acquires Taiwan, we're stuck in a difficult position: On one hand, our ideals and past promises should lead us to defend countries like Taiwan and South Korea (and Japan, and India) against the same sort of creeping despotism which is currently being seen in Hong Kong. On the other hand, if we do not roll over and play dead, it entirely possible China could use many of the means described in the PLA manual Unlimited Warfare to destabilize our country -- or others -- to achieve its ends.

It might be possible to avoid this problem if mainland China reformed: Taiwan would have undoubtedly have fewer reservations about merging with a truly democratic China. But then we're back to using the only means we have available, in my opinion: varying degrees of economic pressure and isolation.

And, if done properly, such tactics could also delay the problem, allowing more time for polical reform: China's military growth has been helped by several factors:

• Military and industrial espionage -- by unfettered access by Chinese nationals to our military and industry.
  
• Commerical alliances: Companies like Boeing is not merely of commerical interest to the Chinese, but also of military interest. Same thing with microchip production.
  
• Direct subsidy: Here's an interesting incident where the World Bank is directly subsidizing the Chinese military! And here's a case where the US is paying Chinese military air traffic controllers. Minimally, as a taxpayer, this is a waste of money. At worst it's determental.
  

Many of these would be mitigated by a less-friendly economic stance towards the PRC. Compare our reliationship with the USSR to our reliationship with China.

Futher, I believe previous economic decisions have actually sped up the clock on Taiwan by embolding China militarily. During the WTO debates, the China Reform Monitor reported:

Beijing added that Jiang and other senior leaders believe that membership in the WTO would help China weather any embargo imposed by the United States and its allies following a military strike on Taiwan. To avoid American military intervention, PLA generals favor quick "surgical missile strikes against military targets," said a PLA source. "If this does not succeed in bringing Taiwan to its heels, more missile strikes will be launched against civilian targets such as oil depots, electricity plants and highways."

Coversely, I believe the evidence shows Castro was more active in attempting to overthrow South American democracies while receiving funding from the USSR than afterwards.

5. Unfettered trade and economic ties to despots corrupt our own institutions

Certainly, the communist party censors information in China. That comes as no shock. But of greater concern is the necessity China has in feeling it needs to control information abroad as well: it is no more tolerant of criticism outside it's borders than within --  it's just had less ability to censor it. That is changing now.

In the 90's, I began to hear reports that Disney (and other companies) were killing films with anti-China elements in them: the incentive of trade restrictions from China were enough to cause them to censor their own films. If so, then couldn't the situation be used the other way around? Couldn't we demand freedom of the press, and total distribution of all Disney films before even one of them were sold in China?

As China grows economically, it is starting to use it's trading power to bend democratic governments to it's will. Yesterday Permier Hu gave a speech in Australia's Parliament(!), linking a current and future trade deals to supporting its stance against a continued independent, democratic Taiwan:

China held out the prospect of more multi-billion trade deals with Australia today, but said it expected Australian support for China's stand against Taiwanese independence... he urged Australia to support China's territorial claims over Taiwan - an area which could become a security flashpoint if China asserts its claims of sovereignty. "Taiwan is an inalienable part of China's territory," he said. "The complete reunification of China at an early date is the common aspiration and firm resolve of the entire Chinese people.

Certainly, at times the US has done similar things -- moreso recently. But not so bluntly, and for ends I consider quite a bit more laudable. But what's truly telling is the distortionary way China approached this particular situation: the way it used it's power, and shows it will use it in the future again, given more, to squelch debate in democratic Australia.

When Bush gave a speech recently in Parliament, a Green party member heckled Bush. (We saw something similar happen the other night in Germany.) Yet these same representatives were barred from Hu's speech, allegedly, according to one of them, at the behest of a Chinese "agent".

The week before Hu's speech, the Chinese embassy sent out letters to each Australian newspaper asking them politely not to allow groups which didn't like China ("Free Tibet!", etc.) to advertise in their papers and shape public opinion. Currently, that's all the PRC can do -- but imagine the situation when Australian companies are deep into Chinese trade? Simply pressure them, if they don't want to lose their contracts, to have a polite word with "The Age", ABC or member of the Australian press about not running such ads -- under threat of revoking their own advertisments.

As with the Disney and Boeing, the constant lure of "2.5 billion consumers" on the horizon can be a powerful economic incentive to do some pretty stupid things, including doing things that ultimately undermine one's own business and country.

I don't have a polyanna-ish faith that many of our institutions aren't already tainted or riddled with corruption. But neither am I of the absurd opinion that more is no worse. And I'd rather have them sold out, if so, to their stockholders, our government, or American public opinion, than the CCP (Chinese Communist Party).

6. My impression is that most refugees and dissidents advocate the same approach

I'm under the impression that the strongest support for total isolation of Cuba come from those who have left. Certainly, we could guess some of these were wealthy landowners whose businesses were confiscated by Castro, and would rather spite him than help those they left behind. But this doesn't explain the picture entirely: Some have escaped more recently, and many are people who still have relatives there whom they love and share strong ties with.

They have had to suffer through Castro's Cuba. Many of them lived their: They know how the regime things, what it values. How it goes about doing it's business. They have a balance between comfort and freedom which was formed in the crucible of an oppressive dictatorship.

I do not.

As such, if their opinions disagreed with mine, I would certainly not automatically reverse my own, but I would definitely pause to listen to what they're saying, and think seriously about my stance. I do anyway.

In the 90's, admist tremendous International pressure, Harry Wu was released from China. (That it took the likes of Maraget Thather, Bob Dole, Newt Gingritch, Dick Gephardt, and many others to release one political dissident is some indication of how recalictrant China is on this issue.) When he was released he travelled abroad, visited Nazi concentration camps (remarking how similar they were to his own former accomodations of 19 years), and, of course, spoke out on how to reform China.

Regarding the wisdom of a Chinese boycott, it seems Harry Wu is on board:

Behind the scenes in the boycott launch preparations, buzz was also raised as Harry Wu, a top Chinese dissident and Executive Director of the Laogai Research Foundation, became a boycott endorser. The occasion is notable for having been "a long time in coming." In prior iterations of boycott initiatives, Mr. Wu felt constrained to not take an official position on the matter, and he could only nod and wink at campaigners with boycott initiatives. "It is a very welcome occasion to find his support in the boycott column," remarked John Kusumi at the China Support Network. "I'm sure Tibetans can only be heartened and encouraged by this word."

Wei Jingsheng is another recently-released Laogai prisioner. Representative Chris Smith reports:

“At an appearance before my Subcommittee shortly after his expulsion from China, former prisoner of conscience Wei Jingsheng explained the importance of the annual review to the status of human rights in China.  He stated: “The Chinese Communists will only tolerate anything as a result of pressure. Once the pressure has lifted, then there is no question of any tolerance.”  He further explained that, “in the view of the Chinese Communist authorities,” the first and foremost area where the U.S. Government can exert real pressure is “in the field of trade.”

"Boycott Made in China" cites a strike where workers spontaneously quit the government-controlled "union" and organized their own strike, arguing:

If desperate workers are going on strike, without the benefit of unions and strike funds, and when striking is illegal and punishable to the extreme extent of the law, then it is evident that workers in China will approve and endorse any action (like an international boycott of Chinese goods) from the free world that though, possibly causing temporary hardships, is clearly aimed in the long run at helping Chinese workers to secure the rights enjoyed by labor in the free world.

They might be wrong in this, but I can't refute that logic by looking at even my own local striking grocery store workers, who would rather I frequent the dreaded Wal-Mart than the stores which employed them.

7. It's an extension of my own conscience

While it's unrealistic to make every last purchase a social statement of some sort, I'm one of the people who do occassionally try to think about what I'm doing when I "vote with my dollar". I try to avoid subsidising films, stores, and products which I feel hurt people. Many people see nothing wrong with deals where a purchase of some product is tied to a small donation to a charity -- why then should we not be concerned about the opposite effect, when a purchase is tied to some small donation to killing or oppressing people?

And, if I'm free to attempt to avoid Chinese made products (wish me luck), or convince others to do likewise, isn't it a natural extension to try to spread idea to a national level? If one could use accurate evidence to convince a majority of the country that it would be better to unfettered trade with some particular regime, what would be immoral or wrong about that?

And although popularity doesn't prove morality, it seems such an idea would have support. Last I could find, in 2002, about 57% polled opposed normalized reliations with China, and 75% felt the US should restrict trade on human rights issues, and 83% said the same for weapons sales.

A note on informational isolation

By advocating economic boycott or isolation, I'm not at all intending to advocate informational isolation. Certainly "Voice of America" (in the USSR, Cuba, and the Mideast), Satellite TV (Mideast), and the Internet (in contemporary China) can play some role in increasing political freedom and awareness of contemporary society in a repressive one. Usually limits on this flow of information originate within the countries themselves, in the form of scrambling, laws against possessing certain electronics, and website blocking technology.

References and Further Reading

• Laogai Research Foundation Special Reports
• Human Rights Watch: China and Tibet
• US Department of State: Reports on Democracy and Human Rights in China