You'd think with the mishaps in Florida, and all the screaming about people's votes "not being counted" (more than four or five of six times, that is) and hanging chads, we'd want more than ever to make sure elections are fair. Yes?
No. At least, not Georgia Secretary of State Cathy Cox. When computer technologists wanted to add a simple, foolproof mechanism to guard against error or fraud in electronic voting -- a paper printout of selected votes -- she vehemently opposes this precaution:
To the technologists, adding a paper audit trail to electronic voting machines is a no-brainer, but some voting officials, advocates for the disabled and civil rights proponents vehemently oppose the idea.
"We feel very strongly that the addition of a paper receipt creates more problems than it solves," said Chris Riggall, press secretary for Georgia Secretary of State Cathy Cox. Last year, Georgia replaced four different systems across 159 counties with 26,000 Diebold electronic voting machines at a cost of $54 million.
Riggall concedes that hackers, malicious insiders or simple errors could corrupt electronic voting machines, but contends such threats seem remote compared to the immediate, tangible benefits of electronic voting.
In the 2000 election in Georgia, 3.5 percent of ballots cast had no vote for president, while the rate was below 1 percent for votes cast using touch screens, Riggall said. Besides, he added, "paper has been the vehicle for fraud in countless cases of election-related chicanery."
Adding voter-verifiable paper ballots to touch-screen terminals would slow returns and create more complexity for volunteer poll workers, not to mention the added cost, said Mischelle Townsend, registrar in Riverside County, Calif.
Townsend estimates that to upgrade her jurisdiction's 4,250 machines would cost around $1 million. Paper, storage and moving costs would add another $100,000 a year.
But at least when paper votes disappear or are altered, it's fairly easy to detect, said Douglas Kellner, a New York City Board of Elections commissioner.
"It's really difficult to compromise voting machines, but if it does happen, it's impossible to detect," Kellner said. "How do banks detect electronic banking fraud? Because the money is missing. Unlike the banking system, when the votes are missing (from a touch-screen system), you don't know that they were stolen."
Others contend that paper confirmation ballots compromise the accessibility of electronic terminals.
"You're going to suppress the votes of the disabled, seniors and those with limited English," who may not be able to read the receipts, said Los Angeles-based Shawn Casey O'Brien, former executive director of the Unique People's Voting Project, a project that registered disabled voters. It has suspended activities since the 2000 election.
Of course. If you can't read the words on the screen, that's no problem. But if you can't read the same words on the printout, then it's a problem. Yes, it's paper that causes vote fraud. Not corrupt people, no.
And of course, it's more important that we save 10% on our voting costs than be assured we have a fair election.
Want to guess what political party Cathy Cox and her staff belong to? I'm guessing already. Let's see if Google says I'm right...
Yes indeed.
You know, I'm not trying to be partisan. But when you find someone arguing against steps to prevent vote fraud, you really honestly shouldn't be able to predict their political party.
What is with the Democratic party these days?