In this article (about which I expect to write several more blog entries in the near future) Notre Dame philosophy professor Alvin Plantgina discusses the seemingly-improbable configuration of our universe, and notes Richard Dawkins' reaction thereto:

It's as if there are a large number of dials that have to be tuned to within extremely narrow limits for life to be possible in our universe. It is extremely unlikely that this should happen by chance, but much more likely that this should happen if there is such a person as God.

Now in response to this kind of theistic argument, Dawkins, along with others, proposes that possibly there are very many (perhaps even infinitely many) universes, with very many different distributions of values over the physical constants.

When is a belief "scientific"? According to the Karl Popper -- probably the most famous and influential philosopher of science -- a belief can be called "scientific" when it is falsifiable, when there are conditions which could potentially disprove that belief or assertion.

To illustrate: One might demand, as proof of God's existence, some massively improbable event. For example, some people are persuadable by arguments of this sort: If the odds of creating the smallest possible self-replicating molecule are sufficiently high that it should not have happened at all in the lifetime of the universe, then we might reasonably suspect such an event was a "miracle".

If such evidence has been produced (and it seems it has), one defense a determined sceptic has is to try to multiply the probability space until the improbable event becomes probable. If there was a 1 in a bezillion chance that annoying event X happened in the lifetime of the known universe, you suggest that the unseen portion of the universe is actually a bezillion times larger. If some constant in the universe itself seems to have required a "one part in 10 to the sixtieth" (quoting Stephen Hawking) chance to be set the right way to allow life, you propose at least 10 to the sixtieth more universes in order to get rid of that disturbing implication.

Which belief is true is not my point here: I only ask you to note that the former person embraces a "scientific" (falsifiable) test for belief in God: there are conditions under which their demands for evidence could be met, and there are conditions under which at least this demand would go unfulfilled (whatever else they might do with other arguments).

In contrast, the second person ensures that no possible evidence or condition could undermine their belief. In this case, every argument from improbability can be dissolved by multiplying entities. (And so much for Occam's Razor!)

When formulating his philosophy of science, this was the classic scenario Popper addressed: Marx proposed the Communist revolution would occur in Europe (a testable condition). When it didn't materialize, his devoted followers modified Marxism by adding entities and qualifiers to explain why it was all still true, despite Marx's failed prediction.

On one hand, people acting this way will experience the warm, fuzzy assurance that their belief appears "unassailable" by any possible set of evidence. (How brilliant they must be!) On the other, for precisely the same reason, the universe no longer has any way of communicating to them that their beliefs might be "wrong". They are in a closed system of belief, with no signs or markers which could lead them out.

Does a belief have to be "scientitific" (disprovable) to be useful, or true? No, not at all. For example, I believe Judeo-Christian values are tremendously helpful -- but how could you possibly "prove" that it's objectively "immoral" to murder an innocent man? I know of no such "proof". But I wouldn't want to live in a society which abandoned that principle. And, as mathematician Kurt Godel demonstrated, there are things which can be actually true or false without being provably so.

But my point is that we don't treat these kind of beliefs as "science" -- we treat them as matters of faith and/or philosophy. We admit openly, to others and ourselves, that they are starting assumptions, premises, and do not run around, deluded, insisting our unfalsifiable beliefs are the irrefutable products of "reason" and "science", as Dawkins does. They are nothing of the sort: they are axioms, postulates, and articles of faith, as surely as the Augsburg Confession is.

But Dawkins does not realize this because he is a lost, lost man.

And I'm not even speaking in spiritual terms yet.