In one of life's little ironies, it turns out that libertarians are, in a sense, "free riders." This proposition might surprise anyone who's listened to Ayn Rand or her followers rant about the evils of sponging off others, but I believe I can make the case fairly succinctly. (For me, anyway.)

First, would you agree with me that "libertarians" are generally more likely to be secular than "conservatives"? That's certainly been my experience. A lot of people in my profession are libertarian, and they're usually also secularists. They understand socialism doesn't work, but they generally embrace stereotypical "left-wing" social values, outlooks, and policies.

A while ago I stumbled upon the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey, which revealed that religious people gave more than secular people. Given that the right was generally much more religious than the left (about twice as much), this also meant, hilariously, that the average conservative was significantly more generous with his or her time and money (and apparently, even to secular causes!) than the average liberal. Since then, Arthur Brooks has made this more widely known through his book Who Gives More? -- and more people can now appreciate this little irony.

But the SCCBS also revealed an interesting tidbit: Who gave less? The very least charitable people were secular conservatives, who, in some ways, fit the exact stereotype the left has of the right. Even secular liberals gave far more than this small subset (comprising about 30% of the right). I was reminded of this yesterday by George Will's column:

The single biggest predictor of someone's altruism, Willett says, is religion. It increasingly correlates with conservative political affiliations because, as Brooks' book says, "the percentage of self-described Democrats who say they have 'no religion' has more than quadrupled since the early 1970s." America is largely divided between religious givers and secular nongivers, and the former are disproportionately conservative. One demonstration that religion is a strong determinant of charitable behavior is that the least charitable cohort is a relatively small one -- secular conservatives.

Who are these people who believe in conservative economic principles, but not conservative religious principles? In short, I'm guessing these were libertarians, since they had no distinct category for this group (of which I'm aware) on the SCCBS.

In recent years, many conservatives and libertarians have come to understand the tremendous role that free markets play in our prosperity. But I believe we do not yet understand well the other pillar: charity and other religious values. I'll try to explain as succinctly as possible:

What do we do with people who are born or become handicapped? Do we let them suffer and die, or do we help them? And if we help them, should we help them primarily through private charities, or is this the government's job? The typical modern secular libertarian, in my experience, is not quite prepared to say that the mentally and physically handicapped should be left in the woods to starve -- so many prefer to answer that it is the job of private charity, organized or otherwise.

This idea sounds plausible because we live in one of the most charitable countries on the planet, as measured by private giving. So, oddly enough, the intellectual credibility of the libertarian case rests upon the existence of a large number of fellow religious conservatives, without whom there would be little evidence for the efficacy of private charity. In their absence, debate would devolve to favoring either public charity, or Jonathan Swift's suggestion that the poor might be, in fact, quite delicious when prepared properly.

But the libertarian philosophy isn't merely a free-rider in this present tense. I believe this is historically true as well.

In my experience, the modern libertarian thinks that as long as you're "rational", and have weapons and trade, modern Western Civilization will naturally result. But it doesn't and didn't: Certainly there have been "free markets" (and weapons) all around the world, since time immemorial. China is an ancient civilization, and Rome was quite advanced in some ways -- why did none of these produce anything like modern science and capitalism?

China, though much more secular (in some ways) than Europe, did not realize the same lasting technological and social gains. The Chinese invented printing presses, clocks, gunpowder, the compass, and all manner of clever technologies -- and even briefly hosted a huge iron-smelting industry. Yet by the time Westerners arrived, many of these were unknown in China. The West seemed to have had something the Chinese lacked.

As I see it, there were several key differences, all of which touch on religion and charity.

For one, modern technology could never have arisen in a slave-holding culture. There was no need for wind- and water-mills in any society where slaves could do the same labor more cheaply. And in societies like Rome and Greece which had large slave populations, it was important to keep slaves busy lest they have time and energy to revolt. So while the Romans knew about the steam engine, they saw no use for it. It was only after Europeans had eliminated slavery (around 800 AD) that automated contrivances began to replace manual labor. And Europeans eliminated slavery, it's important to note, only because their religion impelled them to do so. It was, frankly, a charitable act which paved the way for modern technology.

Likewise, as Russia demonstrates, it's hard for capitalism and freedom to thrive in a chaotic or authoritarian society. Robust, non-kleptocratic capitalism requires a government limited enough not to micromanage markets by favoring one group over another (as the Chinese rulers often did), but also a government strong enough to protect property rights. That combination is a bit rarer than people might imagine; there are many things which can mess it up. In the absence of these conditions, you will still have trade (often run by criminals or rulers) but you can't spontaneously produce anything like the large-scale enterprises which contributed to the Western standard of living.

Like other such societies, Pagan Rome (and Greece beforehand) were incredibly violent. Greece was locked in perpetual warfare, as was Rome, and Roman despots needed to keep the masses occupied with spectacularly violent forms of entertainment. And Pagan Roman cities themselves were so violent that Juvenal once joked: "You could be thought lazy and careless if you go [out] to dinner without writing a will!"

What can I do?
Especially in the face of a frenzied maniac
Who, by the way, is stronger than I am? ...
You can try to say something,
Or you can try to slip quietly away,
It really doesn't matter one way or another:
You're going to get pounded, and taken to court
The next day because you bothered him.
You see, this alone is the poor man's freedom:
After being beaten and punched you have the right
To ask that a few teeth be left in your mouth.

This doesn't exhaust all the dangers in the city.
For there is always someone to rob you,
No matter how tightly you lock your house
Or seal all the shutters of your shop with fastened chains.
Sometimes thugs do their job quickly with a knife.

Why all the violence? A part of the answer, I believe, lies in the Roman family structure. Like all Pagan societies, Greece and Roman tended to discard baby girls as unwanted, leaving a surplus of men without partners. (Many other Pagan civilizations allowed multiple wives, or otherwise informally allowed more successful men to accumulate several women as concubines or mistresses, exacerbating the gender imbalance.) This is the same problem the Middle East and China face today (for much the same reason): As Boer and Hudson demonstrate in Bare Branches, societies with too many single males tend to be violent and/or authoritarian. Hence the frequent wars and tolerance of (or even enthusiasm for) authoritarianism in such places. For example:

Indian scholars have noted a very strong relationship between sex ratios and violent crime rates in Indian states, which persists even after controlling for a variety of other possible variables. And worldwide, more violent crime is committed by unmarried young adult men than by married young adult men.

According to sociologists, young adult men with no stake in society -- of the lowest socioeconomic classes and with little chance of forming families of their own -- are much more prone to attempt to improve their situation through violent and criminal behavior in a strategy of coalitional aggression with other bare branches.

Historically, governments facing a growing population of bare branches find themselves caught in a dilemma. They must decrease the threat to society posed by these young men but at the same time may find the cost of doing so is heavy. Increased authoritarianism in an effort to crack down on crime, gangs, smuggling and so forth can be one result. [Washington Post]

(Another outcome is that demagogues can marshal this untapped violence to rise to power.)

As with the elimination of slavery, the decision to keep and raise girls, and to restrict one's sexual bonds to a single wife (and thus not create multiple rival families, akin to what happens in today's divorce arrangements) was a charitable act, one which arose from deep religious differences between Christians and their Pagan countrymen. And without the more stable, peaceable societies these family structures produced (in Northern Italy, the Netherlands, and England, "a nation of shopkeepers"), European capitalism, with (as early as 1000AD) its insurance companies, banks, corporations and stockholders could never have arisen -- and nor could the resulting gains in wealth and health.

The modern libertarian looks around, observes the results of these events, and concludes: "See, this is what trade has produced!" But it wasn't trade alone. It was trade in Christian Europe, where even rulers believed people had some basic God-given rights, where a lack of slavery made technology meaningful, and where relatively stable family structures generally allowed people's efforts to be plowed into economic expansion rather than sexuality or violence.

And of course most of us have one or more ancestor who would not be here without an act of private charity. So most of us owe a debt to the idea of private charity -- including those "secular conservatives" that give the least, among anyone, to such causes.

Looking into the future, we see the trend playing out in reverse: As libertarians and liberals support the removal of disincentives to alternative family structures, more children grow up in unstable situations, without the same mom and dad present. Every bit of sociological evidence we have shows that children of such families are more prone to crime, promiscuity, drug use, and mental illness.

Such families and offspring also tend to demand a large, powerful state, rather than the limited government libertarians imagine they're working to promote. And as people become increasingly secular, the evidence indicates they will give less to charity, allowing yet more ideological room for the argument that a powerful government needs to intervene to alleviate the resulting symptoms.

What the liberals say about these "secular conservatives" is frequently true: they have been given every advantage by society, and a unique spot in world history, and tend not to give anything back. Even worse, they usurp intellectual credibility their philosophy does not warrant, and, worst still, they unintentionally undermine the very liberty they say they cherish most.

(Again, there will always be exceptions: I'm talking about trends, not individuals.)

So I'm a conservative, not a libertarian.