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In "My Political Coke vs Pepsi Taste Test", I mentioned that I'd recently stumbled into a conversation (between friends with a more liberal bent) about origins of and solutions for the current problem. Talking about BlameI said, during that conversation, that I didn't think "blame" was especially helpful, given that those who caused the problem (in my view) probably had noble motives. But it should be important to figure out what went wrong and learn from that, and avoid such mistakes in the future. I don't blame my grandfather for being an ardent socialist -- such beliefs may have looked sensible back then. But its another matter entirely to pursue the same policies today. Yet I notice those around me who do approach each new crisis by first reflexively looking to "blame" -- and indeed, even in my own work, I first ask "why did this happen?" (But is the question one of diagnostics, or one of finger-pointing? That's what I try to remember.) Yet when I listen to the mainstream news media, most articles and reports I heard were directly or indirectly faulting "Bush's economic policies" or "capitalism" or "greed" -- with very little or no explanation why this should be so. Yet it is also not uncommon, in my experience, that those who burst out of the starting gate screaming about blame also tend to shift into "outrage mode" when said blame is actually found to reside rather closer to their own doorstep. "Why are you blaming me?!? It's wrong to be 'pointing fingers' in a time like this!!!" (Is it? I hadn't noticed they really believed that, given their former behavior.) So my friends seemed incredulous that someone might (ridiculously) be implicating Clinton-era policies, or Congressional Democrats in 2003. ("Think Progress" even wants us to believe that by implicating risky loans, people are being racist -- as such loans were frequently made to minorities.) But my friends and I all agreed that it was important to first find the facts, and only then offer opinions. So I'd like to briefly air my rather limited understanding, and open it up to any critiques others might have of the factual correctness. Keep in mind there may be multiple causes, not just one. Glass-Steagall Repeal / Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act?This Kossite is incensed that the blame isn't resting easily and nicely where her peers first placed it ("my dad and other like-minded Republicans looking for someplace to lay the blame") and so is looking for any handy counter-narrative from her Kos peers. A tiny minority agree her dad is right, but one suggests Clinton's repeal of the Glass-Steagall might be at fault (i.e. this was caused by Clinton's right-leaning tendencies, not his left-leaning ones). In its place, Clinton and Congress passed Gramm-Leach-Billey, which stands today. Yet I don't understand this narrative, and, other than references to it being thrown around (as if just naming the act itself was self-explanatory) I don't really see any clear explanation. Glass-Steagall was meant to prevent banks from investing in stocks or engaging in other conflicts of interest -- but what happened here was making bad loans -- loans which would still have been perfectly legal under Glass-Steagall. Since this argument is coming from Democrats, I think the burden is still on them to explain precisely what they mean here. Any links would be helpful. "Greed" / CapitalismWhen a Republican is in the White House, an active stock market is portrayed as "a climate of greed". Thus the late 1980s were "a climate of greed" somehow caused by Reagan. (Hollywood followed suit, releasing films like "Wall Street" and "They Live".) Yet those same tendencies and actions, played out even larger in the 1990s, were then portrayed in the press as "a robust economy" -- despite the fact much of it was actually, in retrospect, a cheap-interest-fueled bubble. (I remember NPR telling me, unbelievably, that it was possible that the stock market might only go up from then on.) Greed is an ancient emotion -- and it certainly was around in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Yet these risky (called "predatory" -- yet aren't all loans made for a profit?) loans didn't appear, in any appreciable numbers (to the best of my knowledge), until the 1990s. If so, then something other than "greed" must have ushered in that turning point. (And when the people who blame "greed" discover a way of eliminating it from human nature -- including those humans who will lead the more-powerful forms of government they tend to favor -- they should let the rest of us know. My only solution is religious faith, and that's only helpful if one takes it rather seriously.) Community Redevelopment Act + Clinton Modifications + FM/FM?There's a video (with supporting documentation & links here) going around which explains this position. To its credit, it has lots of references and makes a fairly strong case. On the other hand, it's unhelpfully partisan and preachy (as if I can talk!), doesn't give enough links (I had to do a bit of scrounging to find the supporting link above), and goes by pretty quickly. But it does make some seemingly powerful points. For example, it cites this 2000 article by the "Corporate Social Responsibility" crowd, talking about a Fannie Mae which was, by this time, now well-staffed with former Clinton administration officials. This is a powerful point because you have a leftist source happily describing how "socially responsible" it is to be creating a market for these new loan categories. (Underlining added.)
In other words, Fannie Mae was making the formerly-impossible possible: formerly an institution would evaluate each loan, as the article says, "on an individual basis" -- looking at the individual's situation. Now, the institution could just log into a website and *presto*, Fannie Mae would guarantee to pick it up. And notice how the article admits admits Fannie Mae is creating room for "variances" in "expense-to-income ratio" (i.e. loans to people already living on credit!), "loan-to-value ratio" (loans to overvalued real estate!), and "borrower contribution" (including "no money down!" -- a guy can't provide an initial payment, and you expect him to take on regular mortgage payments?). The left is calling them "predatory loans" today, but here, with your very own eyes, you see an entirely different (proud and glowing) take at the time. And the then-lauded-as-"responsible" bank CEO's mentioned in this release are following right along.
Nationwide, Bank One, First Union -- these institutions were being lauded for "expanding options" to poorer communities and otherwise-risky situations (including well-off people getting in over their head), in response to new markets being directly created by government entities (and in response to threats) -- which are now called "predatory", as if the nature of these loans had somehow changed between 1999 and today. And of course since this formerly-untenable situation was now made profitable, many of these banks then gave sweetheart loans and generous contributions to those who in the state who now controlled their profits. (Just as any conservative would predict.) And indeed, regarding the CRA itself, even Wikipedia notes (as of today -- history often changes at Wikipedia):
After Clinton, a bad CRA rating would open banks up to charges of discrimination (read: "lots of lawsuits") and unrelenting pressure and criticism from "social responsibility" groups like the one I quote above. I've seen various attempts to counter this argument, but they frequently don't strike me as even intellectually honest, much less successful. This argument for example: "As Robert Gordon shows, however, this is crap. First, there's the timing. CRA came in 1977. The crisis came in 2007. Indeed, by 2004, the Bush administration had weakened the CRA." The author being is very sensitive to the idea that Bush may have somehow weakened the CRA (which may be true or not -- sorry, haven't yet investigated) but somehow completely overlooks Clinton's major overhaul of the same legislation. The author also argues: "Another 25%-30% [of subprime loans] came from companies with very little CRA exposure." The context treats this particular argument as devastating, but it's actually a stunning admission: A bit like claiming that you only started 75% of the fires which burned down houses in your town! When the revised CRA and the FMs' actions started to take effect, a huge influx of new potential buyers entered the market. What does basic economics tell us about such a situation? When supply exceeds demand, prices rise. And so we see, as the video pointed out, that home prices started to rise much faster than inflation. When that happened, even non-CRA lenders would have had a huge incentive to adopt risky loans: if the borrower defaulted, the projected rise in home values would have covered the losses, or perhaps even yielded a profit. Add that to the fact (omitted by the author above) that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were also important factors, "guaranteeing" to buy risky loans (they were, in fact, lying about their own levels of capitalization) -- and thus creating a market for such products -- and there was really no reason NOT to issue lots of risky subprime debt. Many might say such behavior was characterized by "greed." But as I said, greed is nothing new: before the incentives were changed that same exact "greed" had led banks to be averse to making risky loans. If one engages in social engineering, arguing one was surprised by "greed" is no defense at all: the social engineer must take into account known behaviors of markets and individuals, and the tendency of businesses to maximize profits is hardly an unforeseeable one. "Product Labeling" ProblemsI was recently talking to a Christian mortgage broker. (I seem to know a surprising number of those.) Part of his "ministry" to others was finding financially distressed people who were in bad loans and shifting them over to better loans at no cost. He told me he met a significant number of people who were unaware that they were in a variable-rate program, not having read all the voluminous fine print, and perhaps also having been deceived at closing time. So I *am* convinced there was some non-negligible number of people deceived (at least in his area -- Los Angeles) about the financial product they were receiving. I have always been a strong supporter of product labeling laws: people should know what they're getting and get what they agree to. (A Christian or Jew only needs to spend a few minutes studying the bible's injunctions against, and punishment for, "deceptive weights and measures" to understand why this is a completely just and useful (and biblical) role for government.) BUT -- not to excuse or justify this behavior -- BUT that behavior was an obvious result of the incentives outlined above. Had these institutions still been risk-adverse, had the FM's not been encouraging these loans, and had housing prices not been rising, there would have been no significant new incentive to get otherwise-ineligible borrowers into homes "by any means necessary." Though I would like to see this problem fixed (with better labeling laws, just like we do with foods) the argument itself conflates cause and effect. Attempted Republican ReformsMy friends were rather sceptical of the argument that Republicans (particularly Bush and McCain) had tried to reform Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac back in 2003. How could Democrats thwart such an effort, if they were a minority? But if the difference in numbers is close (it was, I think), and a few Republicans defect, and Democrats stick together and vote a party line, such a thing is indeed possible. Yet here is a New York Times article (hardly a right-wing source), written at the time (so there's no hedging as we'd have now) which admits that, in their eyes, back then, that was indeed a possibility. In fact, given the tone of the article and how it closes, the Times rather seems to have been trying to encourage that outcome.
Initially, I had heard of only one attempt to reign in these government-staffed "companies". Instead, I was surprised to find Republicans kept trying over and over -- in 2003, 2005 (here, also) ... in fact, it appears, according to one blogger, Bush and Republicans raised the warning no less than 17 times in 2008 alone. (There's a nice timeline there, starting in 2001.) I don't claim to understand the exact mechanisms by which these attempted reforms were blocked. (Again, any insight or documentation would be welcomed.) Perhaps its even true that Bush and Republicans didn't do everything in their power. Yet even in that scenario, my friends' narrative makes no sense: If Bush and Republicans were on the "correct side", but didn't do as much as he could have (and thus still deserve blame) then doesn't that also imply that the Democrats would therefore have been far more culpable, being entirely on the "wrong side of history"? Any Others? / ConclusionAre there any counter-arguments I might have missed? If you can think of any reasonable holes in the arguments above, or if you have any other reasonable theories, please chime in. (I saw a video by CNN recently (first online and then on TV) claiming it was a flood of "foreign investments" which caused the subprime collapse. The video didn't seem to make a very strong case for this, other than stating the assumption a few times.) Other than that, I'll sign out with three parting thoughts, based on my current understanding: 1. Initially, my aforementioned liberal friends dismissed the idea that the CRA had anything do with the rise in subprime loans -- despite the fact that was its obvious intent. When they read the Wikipedia page, they seemed rather taken aback to find out it did seem to play a major role. (And, I've since learned, there seems to be plenty of other documentation to support that contention.) But my point is this: These are two fairly intelligent Democrats who consider themselves reasonably well informed. They stay up on the news. The follow politics avidly. They even check out right wing blogs now and then. And yet they were utterly unaware of the arguably most important factors in this debacle, which is causing huge devastation in our financial sector. You'd think that might be kinda important, but, using them as an example, it seems the media was utterly effective at keeping them (and millions of other Americans, no doubt) completely in the dark about it. And not just now, but all along, as Republicans apparently repeatedly and insistently tried to get the word out to anyone who was listening. So it is stunning to see our US media behave like Pravda -- and far more effectively so, because most Soviets were at least aware of Pravda's bias and tricks. There was no expectation of integrity, or even a semblance of balance, as there is here, even from the most left-leaning news sources. 2. It increasingly appears that the "Clinton prosperity" was largely borrowed from the future. After Gore lost the election, he and Greenspan stood on stage together to announce that Greenspan had deflated the bubble (by finally raising his ridiculously low rates), and Gore gleefully announced (I saw this live) that the ensuing recession would be "a W-shaped one" -- and raised Greenspan's arm in a triumphant gesture. (I realized that day that Greenspan had indeed sold us, the US citizens, out to support the current administration.) And indeed it was as Gore predicted (he's right once, anyway): Bush took office amidst a collapsing economy, yet managed, admirably, to quickly turn it around and move us back to employment levels which were similar to those in the 1990s. (But which the press continually and dishonestly portrayed as dismal.) During that time, we were hit by 9/11, several months of which could have been arguably pinned on the Bush administration. Yet eight years had elapsed previous to those few months, and a tremendous amount of evidence (that which wasn't destroyed, anyway) showed that Clinton had known about these threats and done nothing. Similarly, the Democrats had argued that Saddam was a huge threat to the mideast, supported terrorism, undoubtedly was trying to acquire WMD, and needed to be deposed. The Bush administration, and the American public during these last eight years, rightly or wrongly paid the price to finally carry out the policies and goals that were stated to be correct, but not paid for nor carried out in earnest, during the 1990s. So here we are, looking another meltdown. And when we dig, what do we find? More policies which originated, and were deliberately created, in the 1990s. Yet again, my point here isn't so much to blame as diagnose. My point is only the old conservative stance: government should be small (as it hurts far more than it helps) and growth should be sound, not a result of state manipulation. We shouldn't unduly excoriate Clinton -- who no doubt had good intentions -- but we should neither elect a guy who seems to have the exact same approach, and indeed, seems to have, in record time, received the second-largest political donations from these corrupt organizations. Conversely, McCain should get some credit where due for correctly predicting this problem and having made the right recommendations, as should Bush. At the very least, the media should cover that story and let the voters decide. 3. Though I see no demands that Fannie Mae executives forgo their (utterly obscene, given the fraud) compensation, there are many calls demanding that the executives of these "failed companies" not be given "golden parachutes". Even the House Republicans are on board with this idea, as I myself was on Friday. But if the above is true, then that's perhaps a wrong-headed and immoral approach. If these organizations, particularly the old stalwart Bear Stearns, failed in small or large part (the latter seems more likely) because they were simply complying with the government's directions and policies, when they wouldn't have otherwise, then it is YOU AND I who owe THEM an apology -- and possibly compensation. We all elected a leader. That leader, as our representative and reflecting the values that put him into office, instituted carrots and sticks to cause this set of incentives, which eventually destroyed companies who were otherwise responsible enough to even have survived the Great Depression. Moreover, we recently further empowered the very Congressmen who had been protecting Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac all along. So I now take issue even with the conservative House Republicans: If all that's true -- if -- then justice seemingly demands we should be paying back, out of our own pockets, the money lost due to the policies enacted by we, the people. And perhaps, if that were done, and the taxes were spread out fairly evenly among those who voted (rather than concentrated in a few wealthy scapegoats), that would teach us a lesson. Of course, in real life, no such thing will occur. I'll be happy if the media finally admits even the most basic arguments involved here. But that is, it seems to me, the most just argument about what should be done. I'd welcome your thoughts, friends. Best to you! Marginal Revolution attempts to refute this argument. It's frankly over my head. Especially for as late as it is. mmm. Sleep. Posted by: Ryan W. on September 29, 2008 03:08 AM Refute that argument? What argument? I'm not being facetious here: I've follow the link and I see are repeated insistences that the Glass-Steagall act was a good move. No evidence, no detailed step-by-step explanations -- nothing. I mean, it's a bit like this: "Chocolate causes AIDS. Some say otherwise. Boy are they ignorant. Look, here's a link to a Frontline episode which also claims 'Chocolate causes AIDS'. Boy are they right! ... Clearly, AIDS could be contained if we'd just stop selling chocolate! I'm really annoyed at people who have been duped into not believing the chocolate causes AIDS." Truth value of the thesis aside, there's nothing there I can grasp hold of or evaluate. It's not an argument so much as a statement of faith. In contrast, I completely understand the opposite point: Businesses want to make profits. One way to do that involves not going under. Businesses which diversify have less risk, and thus are less likely to go under. Banks who put their investments into businesses and properties are probably going to be better off during turbulent times than those who are tightly restricted to one corner of the market. One stock is risky. Two stocks is, on average, less so. When you have a little bit of stock in everything, your risk is similar to the aggregate amount of risk contained in the economy as a whole -- which no-one can avoid, except if you're a cave dweller. Goodnight! Posted by: Tim (Random Observations) on September 29, 2008 03:37 AM I'm not sure I understand your response, Tim. The first post that I pasted attempts to argue that mixing two financial industries allows a bubble in one to spill over into the other, allowing a larger bubble (possibly since the bubble has more assets to draw on) and forcing a larger bailout. Banks were FDIC insured. Mortages weren't, if I understand correctly. But now mortgage problems will require FDIC insurance to kick in. If the diversification of banks increases risk of bank failure, as it did both now and in the great depression, should the price of their FDIC insurance go up as well? You asked for links by Democrats explaining how Glass-Steagall related to the current crisis. That seemed to be one. I think it's only a small piece of the puzzle. It may be outright wrong. But it didn't seem superficially wrong, at least. The Marginal Revolution link attempts to refute the importance of Glass Steagall. It says Given a history like this people wonder how repealing the law could have been a good thing. ... Raghuram Rajan found that (jstor) securities issued by unified banks were (ex-post) of higher quality that those issued by investment banks. This is a claim that I don't have time right now and may not have the background to dig into. I hope that makes more sense. Posted by: Ryan W. on September 29, 2008 02:42 PM Sorry -- I'll try again. I'm not seeing anything in the first link which proves (nor even provides meaningful evidence for) the effectiveness of Glass-Steagal. Instead of using an analogy, I'll excerpt all the parts which discuss Glass-Steagal directly.
What have we got here so far? "It was felt." "May be partly to blame." No evidence offered yet. Continuing...
So Ctiigroup could invest in SIVs. Yes... and?? Is that it? Other than the acronym (which was new to me), that's what we're already saying. ("Banks can invest in securities" + "SIVs are securities" = "Banks can invest in SIVs") Banks could also buy all kinds of crazy derivatives or options now. They could, in theory, buy Google stock for $500 and sell it for $0.01. And even before the repeal, they could have underwritten completely absurd housing or business loans. (Lending money to a business is just as risky as buying its stock.) Or engaged in embezzlement and fraud. Or lit giant piles of money on fire and danced around it. And??? Is there some evidence that Citigroup does invest in SIVs -- and that they're likely to be harmful? Or that they're at least likely to do so, for some reason? Is there evidence that the ability to invest in securities somehow creates a sudden blindness to risk which they'd always been careful to avoid, presumably for the same reasons, when making loans? None is offered, nor even implied.
Sarcasm, but no content. Continuing...
Again, "Volker is unconvinced." "Boy was Volker right." That's evidence? I'm sorry. There's nothing here I can grasp onto. No mechanism, no story involving cause and effect, no supporting evidence. Just a restatement of the current laws, assertions of badness, and a couple flavors of "some people feel that..."
As I read it, there are two thesis statements here. One is the unspoken assumption that if bankers can do something stupid with securities they will. "Banks could invest badly!" (But the other assumption is that they'd wouldn't make a similar mistake with loans, which are also a kind of investment.) But, again, its not even spoken, much less supported. Further, it I think there's some obligation to move an argument from "this could happen!" (especially when one should already find evidence of it) into the realm of likelihood. It's as if we are arguing against allowing the introduction of automobiles by saying that people might try to eat them as food, or drive them frequently into storefronts. Well, yes -- but is that likely? And (given that G-S was repealed a decade ago) is it, in fact, happening in any meaningful numbers? The other thesis, it seems to me, is that "commercial banks had been allowed to underwrite securities and had therefore exposed depositors to stock market risk." Okay, I know they feel that way. That's the origins of the law. But was it true even then? Would it be true today? They only suggest "it was felt" as an answer. Okay, but that's a position statement, not an evidence- or logic-based argument.
Raghuram Rajan found that (jstor) securities issued by unified banks were (ex-post) of higher quality that those issued by investment banks. Isn't this obvious? Let's say I invest in just one company. There is a certain probability that the company will fail. Now let's say I spread my money among two companies. That probability is reduced further. (Say 1/10 for each: so together my odds of total loss, simplistically, would be 1/10 x 1/10 or 1/100.) Of course, that's "simplistic" because they might be in the same industry, which might have a bad year. So you invest across several industries. Yet the market itself might go up or down as a whole. But then you could buy precious metals, and mitigate that risk too. My point here is that (contrary the previous thesis) the wider one spreads one's investments, the less risk one incurs. Mutual funds are less risky than individual stocks. That's also the principle behind the whole insurance industry. So of course if Bank A only invests in one area (say consumer loans, car loans, and real estate loans), and Bank B can invest in that plus several more (including some market indices, bonds, and hedge funds) Bank B can incur less risk, and, on average, have more ability to smooth out shocks and even out cash flow -- allowing them to offer higher-quality products. Moreover, banks wish to stay in businesses. Just as they avoid unduly risky loans, so also they will have an incentive to avoid unduly risky securities, just as they (absent government incentives to the contrary) typically avoid unduly risky loans. Why isn't this a reasonable response? I'm not saying there couldn't be something I've overlooked -- perhaps my argument is wrong in the end. But at least it's a cogent argument, with some simple math, citations of real life examples, and explanations as to why risk should go up or down in certain relevant cases. I'm not merely invoking the magical concept of "exposed to stock market risk", as if the stock market radiates some kind of "risk" which we will, without argument or cause, presume to be worse than that which is present in the other alternatives. The stock market is only risky because all money-making ventures are risky. Yet it's also risky to leave your money under a mattress or in a chest buried in your backyard. (Or in real estate loans, today, apparently.)
The first post that I pasted attempts to argue that mixing two financial industries allows a bubble in one to spill over into the other, allowing a larger bubble... It says no such thing. It says argues investing in stocks "exposed depositors to stock market risk" -- not that a bubble was made bigger. These are two completely different statements. Let's say that tech stocks are in a bubble -- people think they're worth 100% more than they really are. Given this consider: Scenario A: Only white men invest in tech stocks. (Versus...) Scenario B: Both white men and black women invest in tech stocks. Was the "bubble" larger between scenario A and B? No, the bubble was the exact same size, and represented the same amount of risk, the same overvaluation. But it was shared by more people (and thus was individually less threatening) in scenario B. If we wanted to "bail out" everyone hurt by that bubble, the amount of cash would at worst be identical, or -- if we only tried bailing out those who were severely threatened-- smaller in scenario B. Of course, its hard to know where a "bubble" is occurring or we'd never experience them in the first place. Everyone would know: "Oh, that's a bubble" and it wouldn't get very far. So it makes sense to spread risk because most of us aren't good at spotting bubbles, except in retrospect.
I'm sorry, I'm lost again. I don't see how this connects to the previous or following content. Mortgages are generally backed by the value of the property itself. Risky mortgages were supposedly backed by Fannie Mae. Fannie Mae lied about its (already perilously low) capitalization. FDIC would be of no more use if it were run the same way.
If the diversification of risk increases the odds of failure, we're living a wacky upside-down universe, where 1/10 x 1/10 > 1/10! (2/10, perhaps?) If that's true, then we should stop using insurance altogether, including FDIC -- since all the FDIC does is mitigate risk by pooling (i.e. diversifying) it, thus -- by your argument -- increasing risk of loss! (And I'm not at all convinced that banks failed during the great depression because their risk was too "diversified"! (Nor have I seen any evidence to that effect yet.) Guessing from total ignorance, I would venture the problem was undercapitalization and insufficient diversity.)
Okay, I'll buy that. So I've explained in more detail why it, like the others I've seen, seems utterly vacuous. I already was familiar with the naked assertion "Repealing Glass-Steagal caused it!" I was hoping for some, you know, evidence, or even reasoning. You've supplied some, but it seems to me it added by you -- I'm not seeing any in the original. (Not that it shouldn't be answered even then, mind you.) The Democrats should hire you, Ryan. You offer far more convincing arguments for their positions than they seem to. (I say this to your credit.) Posted by: Tim (Random Observations) on September 29, 2008 08:55 PM I suppose the difficulty of identifying speculative bubbles may make laws like Glass Steagall easily ineffective. I can see that point. Or engaged in embezzlement and fraud. Well, that's illegal and can be prosecuted. So we have an extra disincentive against that kind of thing. They could, in theory, buy Google stock for $500 and sell it for $0.01. Well, I'm only superficially familiar with the law here, but wasn't Glass Steagall supposed to prevent that? Isn't that what we're discussing here in the first place. Was the "bubble" larger between scenario A and B? No, the bubble was the exact same size, and represented the same amount of risk. But it was shared by more people (and thus was individually less threatening) in scenario B. I don't really know enough about the nature of bubbles to address this properly. I would think that making a larger amount of assets available to a speculative bubble would increase its size if it works a little like a pyramid scheme and prices are not limited by value, but rather by the money available to the bubble, which requires the backing of more and more real assets. But I'm stretching beyond my background here. In the 1980s savings and loan crisis, some banks were widely known for losing a lot of money, yet people still continued to pour in large sums of money to them through brokered CDs because they offered higher interest rates than other banks, and because the deposits were insured by the federal government. The troubled banks were gambling with the deposits on high risk loans or stealing them outright. If they won, the bank owners would profit. If they lost, the deposit insurance would pick up the tab. But because the deposits were insured, people didn’t care whether the banks would lose them or not. The crisis became much larger than it otherwise would have been. Thefinancebuff Does this mean that FDIC insurance allows more money to flow into speculative bubbles? If Bank of America, say, offers a higher interest rate for checking accounts based on their investments in a speculative bubble, aren't they in competition with other banks, essentially forcing less economically conservative investment during booms unless a competitor has enough funds to ride out the bubble and stay competitive? Or should some companies just recognize the bubble and leave the industry for a few years then return? Theoretically that would work, but I've never heard of anyone doing it in real life. Ryan: Banks were FDIC insured. Mortages weren't, if I understand correctly. But now mortgage problems will require FDIC insurance to kick in. Via the above scenario where FDIC insurance allows a financial institution to acquire capital to engage in risky investments? The Democrats should hire you, Ryan. You offer far more convincing arguments for their positions than they seem to. (I say this to your credit.) Posted by: Ryan W. on September 30, 2008 03:40 AM [Embezzlement and fraud are] illegal and can be prosecuted. So we have an extra disincentive against that kind of thing. Risky behavior (by the definition of "risk") is also likely to cause a negative consequence, and thus has a disincentive. You're making my point for me: All the things I list in this section are possible behaviors which are counter-productive. Yet the "X could happen!" argument pretends that we don't have to look at incentives and disincentives. Just as it's appropriate to say: "Well, there's a disincentive for fraud", so also we should ask: "Isn't there also disincentive for buying risky securities?" Yet the question isn't being considered. So it's a pretty shallow argument, every bit as stupid as saying: "Well, they could STEAL your money!" without any thought of consequences.
You've touched on a seemingly excellent argument here. Again, the Democrats should hire you, because you're offering far better arguments for their views than I'm seeing from them. I suspect in some cases you're right: Such as during the dot-com boom when many CEOs got rich mostly on investor money, fueling a perception of increased value, fueling more investment. That's at least a valid-sounding bit of speculation. But if the articles you yourself have linked to, it doesn't seem to hold up in this case: If banks which have securities holding are more stable (as the author argues the evidence shows), then it would seem that's only a possibility, and that the counter-argument -- that banks are naturally going to be more risk-averse than your average VC or stockholder -- probably predominates.
The argument you cite here is more an argument AGAINST government intervention than for it. Without the FDIC, the "bubble" you cite here might have collapsed far earlier, because consumers wouldn't said: "Yes, I see the higher interest rates, but I *am* concerned about the fishy news reports I'm hearing" -- rather than: "Well, I'll invest here anyway, because the government insures it." I agree with your argument to that effect.
Yes, in my opinion -- at least in the situation you describe with the S&L scandal, where S&L management could indirectly make loans to themselves and cycle that money around in the manner you've described. (I don't think the same rules applied to other banks, so we didn't -- and don't -- see it in that case.)
I would agree it allowed (and probably still allows) them to get more capital. But I don't think the increase in capital itself alone necessarily leads to riskier behavior by management. Indeed, the biggest banks are often those which traditionally have been the most risk-averse, no? Posted by: Tim (Random Observations) on September 30, 2008 10:33 AM The argument you cite here is more an argument AGAINST government intervention than for it. There's a middle ground here. Britain's equivalent of the FDIC apparently insures bank accounts for 90% of value above a certain amount. That insures that large investors with the capacity and desire to research such things wouldn't support irresponsible banks. It also prevents anyone from getting burned too badly for keeping their money in a bank, so people don't start stashing cash under the mattress. Indeed, the biggest banks are often those which traditionally have been the most risk-averse, no? Honestly, I don't know. I suppose that seems reasonable. One other (small) piece of the mortgage crisis seems to be that Countrywide had contracts in place where some of their affiliates had to buy back deficient mortgages. (Small local banks fund mortgages through a line of credit which they then regenerate by selling the servicing rights and note.) But when those affiliates went out of business, Countrywide was left holding the bag. Posted by: Ryan W. on October 2, 2008 09:00 PM Britain's equivalent of the FDIC apparently insures bank accounts for 90% of value above a certain amount.... I didn't know that! I wonder how the "moral hazard" argument plays out there!? Posted by: Tim (Random Observations) on October 4, 2008 08:37 PM Add your two cents...
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Posted by: Ryan W. on September 29, 2008 03:03 AM